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iAUDIT! - Over the past few months, it seems there has been nothing but bad news about the performance of Los Angeles’ homelessness programs. Back in April, the State Auditor released a report saying the state has spent $24 billion on local homelessness programs, including LA’s, over the past five years, with virtually nothing to show for it. Last month, the LA County Auditor reported on LAHSA’s poor financial practices and lack of contract management. Since December 2023, LA’s City Controller has published reports on the disjointed way LAHSA and the City identify shelter vacancies, on how the City has spent only about half its homelessness budget, and how LAHSA loses more people to homelessness than it shelters or houses. In July, an advocate coalition released a survey showing services in Mayor Bass’ flagship program, Inside Safe, are virtually nonexistent. On top of all these, the audit team appointed by federal judge David Carter has been questioning the veracity of millions in billings the City and LAHSA have paid to providers with little or no documentation. News services have called these audits and reports “damning” and “scathing”. Residents must wonder “can it get any worse”?
The answer, unfortunately, is yes. As critical as these reports have been, the City, County, and LAHSA have done almost nothing about them. Despite strong rhetoric and photo ops where they demand “bold change”, our elected leaders seem uninterested in doing the hard work of reforming homelessness programs. The City and County have passed resolutions calling for studies of separating from LAHSA and directly managing homeless services. But strongly worded memos and indeterminable studies are not substitutes for action.
What I find truly concerning is the constant mention of Measure A as a cure-all for the constellation of management failures, as if the infusion of hundreds of millions of dollars in new revenues will magically cure the structural management problems plaguing the City, County, and LAHSA. Will new money stop LAHSA from paying providers without approved contracts? Will it stop the City from paying LAHSA 25- to 30 percent in advance with no questions asked? Why are the very nonprofits that have failed to account for 96 percent of their cash advances from LAHSA allowed to be on committees that will make Measure A funding decisions? I fear the revenue from Measure A will go into the same programs that have done nothing to reduce homelessness for the past 15 years.
What is my fear based on? Consider the Mayor’s December 9 press release on the “progress” her programs made in 2024, and about which I wrote last week. It was basically 11 pages of cheerleading with shaky numbers and unsubstantiated statistics. The central theme was continuing business as usual, but more if it. The press release touted the success of Inside Safe, which is outrageously expensive and loses far more people back to homelessness than it houses.
An audit report from the City Controller came out the day after the mayor’s press release, and was far more realistic--and stark—in its assessment of the shelter-housing system. Rather than the robust, coordinated and interconnected shelter to housing system described by the mayor’s press release, the Controller’s audit documents a system broken from the moment someone enters it, and one far more likely to push someone back to the streets than to house them. A few key items from the audit include:
- Fewer than 80 percent of shelter beds are occupied on any given night, despite the City’s claim there is insufficient capacity to bring more people inside. LAHSA sets a target of 95 percent occupancy, but that has never been attained.
- Fewer than 20 percent of the people in the shelter system have been successfully moved to permanent housing, while more than half returned to homelessness. This is consistent with the State Auditor’s findings in its April 2024 report, and with the city’s performance reports.
- LAHSA’s data quality is so poor, the agency cannot accurately measure provider performance. This is, in large part, LAHSA’s own fault. In August 2023, LAHSA’s management admitted to the City Council it was not enforcing reporting requirements for its shelter providers, meaning the City was paying for vacant Inside Safe rooms
- The City pays for provider expenses regardless of bed occupancy or actual services provided. Provider contracts are based on performing a list of processes meant to make a bed ready for occupancy, rather than the number of beds occupied.
- Even the term “occupied” defies reality. LAHSA defines a bed as occupied if it has reserved space for a client, even if the client doesn’t occupy the bed or only stays one night. This exaggerates the occupancy rate, meaning true occupancy may be far less than 80 percent.
- If someone manages to attain housing, they stand a poor chance of receiving the services they need to stay housed. They may not receive needed long-term financial support or mental health/addiction recovery services that will keep them housed.
- Among those who attain permanent housing, many are in time-limited subsidized (TLS) housing, where a provider will pay rent for as much as two years. At least 12 percent of those in TLS housing fall back into homelessness, half of whom do so within a year.
Nothing in the Controller’s report should come as a surprise to observers of LA’s homeless programs. The audit is merely the latest in a long list of news stories, surveys, and other reports that have detailed the failure of local homelessness program. As if that was not enough proof that things could, indeed, get worse, we can add yet another news report to the list.
As jaded as I am, I admit I was surprised when I saw in Saturday morning's Times the Council acceded to the blackmail demands of corporate nonprofits and approved a rate hike for shelter operations. At least Council members Rodriguez and Lee had the backbone to vote “No”. Rodriguez got to the core of the problem, "We can sprinkle the word accountability into everything and say that we’re recalibrating this ship. The problem is that even today, we still can’t get direct data,” she said. “I can’t continue to aid and abet this broken system,” she added. The shadowy organization, Greater L.A. Coalition on Homelessness, (GLACH) led the charge for more funds. As both Christopher LeGras and I have written, GLACH is little more than a front for the conglomerate of large corporate nonprofits that have a stranglehold on homelessness services in LA. Wouldn't it be so much better to have many smaller more nimble NPO's, based locally in their communities and more sensitive to community needs?
According to the Times, GLACH representatives couldn't produce a list of shelters they'd have to close, but the Council was all too happy to shovel more money at them anyway. One of the NPO's doing the most whining about going broke was PATH, which saw its revenues increase by 149% percent between 2019 and 2023, and its cash on hand increased by 97%. Is this the "greater accountability" we can expect when Measure A pours more money into the system?
Can homelessness programs get any worse? Yes. Will they? That is up to the leaders we have chosen to oversee them and our willingness to hold them accountable.
(Tim Campbell is a resident of Westchester who spent a career in the public service and managed a municipal performance audit program. He focuses on outcomes instead of process.)
